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The New Ohio Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act
A Preliminary View
by Nelson G. Karl*
DURING the past session of the Ohio Legislature, a new Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act' was passed, effective
March 1, 1953, which radically changes the Act 2 now in effect.
The new Act provides that upon the happening of a motor vehicle
accident, where property damage or personal injuries amount to
more than $100.00, all persons involved shall submit a written
report to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, in Columbus, Ohio,
and, if not covered by liability insurance, shall forward security
in the amount demanded by the registrar. If security is not de-
posited, the penalty is the revocation of both the owner's operator
license and the registration of all vehicles owned by him.
The purpose of this Act is to reduce the number of unsatisfied
judgments entered against those found liable in motor vehicle
accidents. The new Act provides that an operator of a motor
vehicle must either carry liability insurance or be in a position to
deposit security if and when he is involved in an accident. Under
the present Financial Responsibility Act, the registrar revokes an
operator's license where there is a failure to satisfy a final judg-
ment. The new Act enables the registrar to revoke this license
before a judicial body has made a determination of liability.
The number of motor vehicle accidents in recent years has
been great. In 1950, for example, there were more than 800,000
motor vehicle accidents in the United States, in which more than
35,000 persons were killed and over 1,200,000 persons incurred
bodily injuries. Property damage amounted to more than
$300,000,000. 3 The plight of the accident victim is a matter of social
concern, the social problem arising when the negligent motorist
* Mr. Karl is a Veteran of two years service in the Navy in World War H.
He received an A. B. degree from Western Reserve University in 1949 and
is in his third year at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
'Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-1 to 6298-93.
" Ohio General Code Sec. 6298 to 6298-26.
'Accident Facts, P. 43 (1951). Published by the National Safety Council.
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is financially irresponsible and does not make compensation for
his acts. There are more than 35,000,000 automobiles traveling
the United States highways today, and this number is expected to
increase. In the State of New York, in 1950, there was a 25%
increase over 1949 in the number of property damage accidents
and in the number of accidents causing personal injuries.4 Re-
duced to an average daily story of accident consequence, motor-
ists in New York State killed upward of 5 persons every day,
injured more than 400 others, and caused about $200,000 of prop-
erty damage daily. These statistics indicate how important it is
for our legislatures to take steps to aid these accident victims.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
A. Administration
The Ohio Act provides that the driver of any motor vehicle
which is in any way involved in an accident5 shall, within 5 days,
forward a written report to the registrar of motor vehicles.6 The
registrar may suspend the operator's license of any person who
fails to report this accident until such time as the report is filed,7
or may punish this person by a fine not to exceed $100.8 Note
that the optional term "may" is used rather than the mandatory
term "shall" as used throughout all other sections of the Act. If
the registrar chose not to enforce the provision for reporting an
accident, he could not be compelled to do so, and the Act could,
thereby, be frustrated at its earliest operating point.9 It is com-
'N. Y. Safety Responsibility Annual Report (1950).
"Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-13 provides that an "accident" or "motor
vehicle accident" means any accident involving a motor vehicle which re-
sults in bodily injury to or death of any person, or damage to the property
of any one person in excess of $100. In Baker v. Fletcher, 191 Misc. 40, 79
N. Y. S. 2d 580 (1948), it was held that a motorist who opened the door of
his automobile in such a manner as to affect the operation of an oncoming
truck was involved in the resulting accident within the meaning of the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act even though there was no contact
between his automobile and the truck.
'Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-17.
Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-21.
'Ohio General Code See. 6298-85.
' Commissioner v. Szumski, 32 Pa. D. and C. 583 (1938). In this case, the
construed statute provides that the Commissioner may suspend an operator's
license if a motorist is involved in an accident which results in a fatality.
The court held that the statute did not make suspension mandatory.
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pulsory upon the person involved in an accident to submit a re-
port, but if he should fail to do so, the registrar may elect not to
enforce compliance with this section of the Act.10
Upon receiving the accident report, if there is an absence of
liability insurance, the registrar must determine the amount of
security which is sufficient, in his opinion, to satisfy any judicial
judgment for damages arising out of the accident." This deter-
mination is to be based upon the accident reports and other
evidence submitted. 12 What the other evidence may be the Act
does not state and this aspect may, ultimately, prove the weakest
point in the entire Act. It places upon the registrar the burden of
determining whether property damage should be evaluated at
$90 so as to fall outside the Act or should be evaluated at $105 so
as to come within the purview of the Act.
In determining the amount of security sufficient to satisfy a
judgment for bodily injuries, there are many components of the
judgment which must be estimated-ultimate total of medical
expenses, length of period of disability, degree of disability,
monetary value of pain and suffering, special damages, loss of
earnings, and the existing trend in jury verdicts of the particular
locality. Yet, the sections of the Act offer the registrar little
guidance in making this estimation.
The State of Wisconsin has inaugurated a specific procedure
to aid the evaluator in the determination of the amount of security
to be deposited. The individual who suffers property damage is
sent to his garageman who certifies the extent of the property
damage. To this is added the approximate court costs and the
interest should a law suit result. In the case of personal injury,
a medical affidavit is prepared by the attending physician. Where
there is possible permanent injury, the State recognizes that a
physician would be reluctant to anticipate a conclusion, so he is
asked to make a brief diagnosis. This diagnosis is first referred to
a panel of physicians in the State Board of Health who have fur-
ther working arrangements with the Medical Society of Wiscon-
sin to refer the diagnosis, in turn, to specialists who then proceed
10 N. Y. Safety Responsibility Annual Report (1950). The failure of operators
or owners to make a prompt, complete and accurate report of an accident as
required by law is the greatest administrative problem and complicates the
entire processing procedure.
" Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-24.
12Ibid.
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to predict the extent of permanent injury.'5 Although this pro-
cedure may seem to be a rather unwieldy method for determining
a mere preliminary fact, the Act in Ohio, by comparison, does
not guide the registrar sufficiently and places him in the position
of a jury when he attempts to evaluate the amount of deposit
sufficient to satisfy a judgment.
It seems reasonable that, in many instances, the security de-
manded will prove insufficient. Occasionally, a victim is unaware
of the seriousness of his injuries, and, frequently, an injury does
not heal properly, or perhaps complications set in. The Act pro-
vides that the registrar may reduce the amount of security
ordered, if, in his judgment, this amount is excessive 14 but, curi-
ously enough, no provision is made for increasing this amount
where the original evaluation is inadequate. 5
These phases of the Act create an administrative problem, and
the responsibility falls upon the registrar to administer the Act in
such manner as not to circumvent or encumber the Act or
thereby impede its anticipated purpose. He is offered much dis-
cretion and latitude, and the ultimate success or failure of the Act
may lie with him.16
B. Constitutionality
Once the evaluation of the amount of deposit is made, security
must be deposited within 10 days after notice has been sent by the
registrar. Upon failure to deposit this security, presupposing no
liability insurance policy is in existence, the registrar must sus-
pend the license of such person and the registrations of all ve-
hicles owned by this person.' 7 This procedure raises at least
four possible arguments that the new Act is unconstitutional.
Private Communication from J. L. Steensland, Attorney and Adminis-
trator of the Wisconsin Safety Responsibility Act, January 4, 1952.
"Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-36.
"Private Communication from A. J. Klaudt, Director, Safety Responsibility
Division, State of North Dakota, January 10, 1952. If the security furnished
is insufficient, the administrator in this state may increase the amount of
security to be deposited.
" 8 Ohio Jur. 151, Sec. 52. If the constitution of the state commands a public
officer to do a particular thing, without directing the manner in which it
shall be done, it necessarily follows that the officer has the implied au-
thority to determine, in the exercise of a fair and impartial official discre-
tion, the manner and method of doing the thing commanded.
"Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-36.
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1. No Showing of Liability is Necessary.
The present Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, in ef-
fect in Ohio, provides for the revocation of the operator's license
only after liability has been determined by the courts and a
judgment has been entered thereon. Under the new Act, the
operator's license can be revoked before there is a determination
of liability.18
To illustrate with a hypothetical situation: Jones, who is
driving without liability insurance, stops for a traffic signal.
Carter, traveling at a speed of 70 miles per hour on slippery
pavement, cannot stop his vehicle in time to avoid striking Jones'
automobile. Force of the collision throws Carter against his
windshield; he incurs a fracture of the skull and is in a coma for
6 days. The registrar, upon receiving the accident report, notifies
Jones that he must post security in the amount of $5000. Ob-
viously, Carter is solely responsible for his injury by virtue of
his own acts. Yet, under the Act, if Jones fails to deposit this
security, his operator's license and vehicle registration must
be revoked. The Act makes no provision for a prior showing of
negligence before placing a motorist within the scope of the Act. 19
It is a well established rule that the legislature is prohibited from
conferring upon tribunals, other than courts, powers which are
strictly and conclusively judicial.20 Is the new Act, for this rea-
son, unconstitutional? A Kentucky case would seem to in-
dicate not, on the theory that no judicial function is in-
tended to be exercised, the taking of the license does not depend
on fault, the Act does not operate on the basis of negligence, and
it does not pre-determine liability but is solely for the protection
of the public.21 It "merely" enforces a showing of financial re-
sponsibility until a judicial proceeding has taken place. Jones
falls within the Act because he was unfortunate enough to be hit
and the taking of his operator's license is mandatory upon the
registrar unless and until Jones can give evidence of "financial
responsibility." 22
" Baker v. Fletcher, 191 Misc. 40, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 580 (1948).
"In Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S. W. 2d 141 (Ky. 1951), the court held that a
motor vehicle financial responsibility law is not unreasonable because it
fails to require a showing of negligence prior to suspension of a license.
20 Ohio Const. Art. II, Sec. 32. Also see 8 Ohio Jur. 260, Sec. 155.
2"Ballow v. Reeves, supra.
' Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-46 states the proof of financial responsibility
means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability in the amount of
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1952
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2. No Preliminary Hearing is Necessary.
The Act makes no provision for a preliminary hearing im-
mediately prior to the suspension of the license, although, it does
provide for hearings requested by a person aggrieved by the acts
or orders of the registrar, and such acts are subject to review as
provided in the administrative procedure act. 23 Is the Act for
this reason unconstitutional? In La Forest v. District of Co-
lumbia24 the court held that a statute empowering the commis-
sioners to revoke a motorist's operating license, with or without
a hearing, for any cause which the commissioner deemed suf-
ficient, and providing for a judicial review, was not unconstitu-
tional as vesting legislative and unregulative discretion in ad-
ministrative officers. In Escopedo v. State Department of Motor
Vehicles25 the Supreme Court of California held that it was not
violative of due process to revoke a motorist's operator license
without a prior hearing since requiring a prior hearing would
substantially burden and delay, if not defeat, operation of the
statute. The court went on to point out that a statute enacted for
the public good is consonant with due process of law.26 This
seems to be a very questionable doctrine; notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard are essential elements of due process of law.
The phrase "due process of law" suggests that a course of law
should be instituted which will enable one whose property is
about to be taken to have notice of a time and place for hearing
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard in his own behalf.27 The
court in Doyle v. Kahl, Commissioner28 held that a statute em-
powering the commissioner to suspend the license of an operator
of a motor vehicle without a preliminary hearing was uncon-
stitutional in that it authorized a taking of property without due
course of law. It should be noted that the court in this instance
used the words "the taking of property." This raises a pertinent
question: Is a license to operate a motor vehicle a property right
whereby a taking without a prior hearing would be violative of
due process of law?
$5000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person and in the amount of$10,000 because of bodily injury or death to more than one person.
"Ohio General Code Sec. 6298-14, Sec. 6298-15.
92 F. 2d 547, 302 U. S. 760, 58 Sup. Ct. 367 (1937).
35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 Pac. 2d 1 (1950).
"Doyle v. Kahl, Commissioner, 46 N. W. 2d 52 (Iowa 1951).
278 Ohio Jur. 708, Sec. 591.
Supra note 26.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/4
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY
3. A Property Right is Invaded.
An early case, Thompson v. Smith, Chief of Police,29 held that
the right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and to transfer
his property thereon, either by horse-drawn carriage or wagon
or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or
prohibit at will, but a common right which he has under his right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This case has not
been generally sustained. In Commissioner v. Funk30 the court
held that permission to operate a motor vehicle upon public high-
ways was not embraced within the term "civil rights," and that a
license to do so was not a contract or a right of property in any
legal or constitutional sense. The court stated that although the
"privilege" might be a valuable one, it was no more than a permit
granted by the State; its enjoyment depended upon compliance
with the conditions prescribed by the state and was always sub-
ject to such regulations and controls as the state might see fit to
impose. This is now the prevalent view. 31 Licensees of motor
vehicles take their licenses and accept the privileges thereof sub-
ject to such conditions as the legislature sees fit to impose.32 Any
appropriate means adopted by the state to insure competence and
care by its licensees to operate motor vehicles and to protect
others using the highways is consonant with due process of law.33
A license to operate a motor vehicle is granted by the state, and
the one who accepts this license must accept all reasonable con-
ditions imposed by the state.34
4. Unequal Protection of the Law.
Financial responsibility legislation has often been challenged
on the ground that it discriminates against the poor and is there-
fore an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law. 3
-155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 71 A. L. R. 604 (1930).
"0323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936).
' Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 Pac. 881, 56 A. L. R. 317 (1927); Silver
v. State, 108 Conn. 37, 143 Atl. 240, 65 A. L. R. 943 (1928); DeVries v. Alger,
329 Mich. 68, 44 N. W. 2d 872 (1950); Garford Trucking v. Hoffman, 114
N. J. L. 522, 177 Ati. 882 (1935).
28 Ohio Jur. 526, Sec. 388. A legal license confers no right or estate.
Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 123 (1942).
Larr v. Didnan, Secretary of State, 317 Mich. 121, 26 N. W. 2d 872 (1947).
The court in this case held the right to impose such conditions was based
not upon the licensee's culpability but upon his status.
" In Ex parte Lindley, 108 Cal. App. 258, 291 Pac. 638 (1930), the court held
unconstitutional an act providing for the suspension of an operator's license
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1952
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There can be no discrimination in favor of the rich or poor; all
must stand in equality under the provisions of the constitution,
and it is this equality that is the pride and safeguard of all.36
The courts have held, however, that although a rule of law may
in certain instances work a hardship, 37 it does not violate due
process providing it operates without discrimination 5 and in like
manner against all persons of a class.y9 Legislation which applies
equally to all in a reasonable designated group is not discrimina-
tory.40 Equality under the constitution is that of right and not of
enjoyment.4 1
5. Summary.
The new Act would seem, therefore, in the light of litigated
cases, to be constitutional. It does not operate on the basis of
negligence and makes no effort to pre-determine liability. It sim-
ply requires a showing of financial responsibility until the con-
clusion of a proceeding before a tribunal. A motorist's operator
license is not a property right, and the state granting the license
may impose whatever conditions in the use of the license it sees
fit including the suspension of this license without a prior hearing.
The right to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege subject to rea-
sonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police
power,42 and the payment of the required license fee does not
convert this privilege into a property right.43 Police power has
upon failure to pay a judgment, because the act predicated the right to
operate an automobile on the financial ability to pay damages rather than
on the skill in operation.
" 8 Ohio Jur. 634, Sec. 492.
"In Munz v. Commissioner, 6 F. Supp. 158, Dist. Ct. S. D., N. Y., (1933),
it was argued that the revocation of the license interfered with the right
to make a living. This argument was not upheld.
" Arizona v. Price, 63 Pac. 2d 653, 108 A. L. R. 1156 (Ariz. 1937); Rawson v.
Department of Licenses, 130 Pac. 2d 876 (Wash. 1942).
Surtman v. Secretary of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N. W. 2d 471 (1944).
"Doyle v. Kahl, Commissioner, 46 N. W. 2d 52 (Iowa 1951).
Nulter v. State Road Commissioner, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549 (1937).
Goodwin v. Superior Court of Yavapai County, 68 Ariz. 108, 201 Pac. 2d
124 (1948). In Rosenblum v. Griffn, 89 N. H. 314, 197 Atl. 701, 115 A. L. R.
1367 (1938), the license of the plaintiff was taken away although there was
no negligence on his part. The court recognized the objections in taking
action before a finding of liability but held the suspension valid as a
matter of public safety. The court stated that the plaintiff happened to be
unfortunate enough to be hit. The operation of an automobile on a public
highway is not a right but a privilege, and, under the statute, there is
equality of treatment.
"Heart v. Fletcher, Commissioner, 184 Misc. 659, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (1945).
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dimensions equal to the public needs, 44 and one using his property
in such a manner as to injure the rights of others is therefore
subject to the police power of the state to regulate and control
its use in order to secure the general safety of the public.
45
II. COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION
A. Existence of the Act in Other States
The new Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act radically
amends the existing law in Ohio. This type of act, however, is not
new to the United States. In 1941, an act was passed in New
York,40 effective April 29, 1942, which provided that the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the license and regis-
tration certificate of any person operating or owning a motor
vehicle involved in an accident unless such person furnishes
security in an amount demanded by the commissioner or unless
the operator or owner had liability insurance at the time of the
accident. This act was the forerunner of the new Act recently
passed in Ohio. Its primary purpose was to reduce the number of
financially irresponsible motorists and, thereby, reduce the num-
ber of unsatisfied judgments resulting from automobile negli-
gence. Missouri followed with a similar act, effective July 1, 1945,
and at this writing, 36 states have similar acts.47 They differ for
the most part, in administrative procedure only.48 Ohio is not a
trail blazer but is following the pattern set forth by most of the
other states.
B. Success of the Act in Other States
One of the better methods to measure the success of financial
responsibility legislation in other states is to examine statistics
"8 Ohio Jur. 334, Sec. 230.
"8 Ohio Jur. 376, Sec. 263.
N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, Art. 6-A.
'
TAla., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Col., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Ida., Ill., Ind., Iowa,
Ky., Md., Me., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev., N. D., N. H., N. J., N. M.,
Ohio, Okla., Pa., R. I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va., W. Va., Wisc., Wyo.
" Ohlson v. Mealey, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 123 (1942). The statute re-
quiring the commissioner to suspend forthwith the license and registration
of a person operating an automobile involved in an accident unless the
owner furnishes security is mandatory and hence, where an automobile
collided successively with a streetcar and a parked car, the commissioner
was required to suspend the petitioner's license and certificate of registra-
tion upon her failure to furnish the required security. In Indiana, Maine,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia, revocation
of the operator's license is at the option of the commissioner.
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of the percentage of motorists carrying liability insurance. Be-
fore passage of the act in New York, approximately 30% of the
motorists carried liability insurance; this number has now in-
creased to 94%.49 Included in the remaining 6% are self-insurers
and others who are not necessarily financially irresponsible.50
Other states, with the act in effect a much shorter period of time,
report the same excellent results. In Minnesota the percentage
of those motorists covered by liability insurance jumped to 80%
within five months after the act was passed, and at this writing,
has surpassed 90%.51 In New Hampshire, the rate increased from
36% to 90% .52 Therefore, as can be readily seen, the Safety
Responsibility Acts have been quite effective, not in reducing
the number of accidents, but in promoting a greater degree of
financial responsibility among operators of motor vehicles.
m. COMPLETION OF THE CYCLE
A. History of Protective Legislation
Massachusetts recognized the social problem presented by
accident victims as early as 1925 when the legislature asked the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts its opinion of the constitu-
tionality of a compulsory liability insurance law. The court said
that under the general police power to regulate highways, the
state had the power to enact compulsory insurance for the pro-
tection of persons injured by the operation of motor vehicles.5 3
'N. Y. Safety Responsibility Annual Report (1950).
Ibid.
14 U. of Detroit L. J. 4 (1951).
2 Ibid.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925). The
court stated "the power . . . to regulate travel over the public ways of the
commonwealth for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in
a reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers. No one has a right
to use streets and other public places as he chooses without regard to the
presence of others. It is an underlying concept of streets and highways that
they shall at all times be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel
and that travelers thereon in the exercise of due care may be secured from
preventable danger . . . The legislature has large powers in the regulation
of the business of insurance. That business is of a peculiar nature. It
affects large numbers of people and is intimately connected with the general
welfare . . . The main objective of the bill is to protect careful travelers on
the highway injured by negligence in the operation of motor vehicles and to
afford them some redress for such injuries . . . The principle which sustains
this aspect of the proposed bill is that, when the general welfare of travelers
on the highway, in the opinion of the legislature, is threatened by and de-
mands protection against a specific evil, any rational means may be adopted
to remedy the evil."
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The legislature then proceeded to pass the compulsory insurance
law which is in effect in the state today.
In 1925, the New Hampshire senate requested the opinion of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court as to the constitutionality
of a similar compulsory insurance law.54 The court thought
certain features of the bill discriminatory rendering constitu-
tionality doubtful,5 5 and the bill failed to pass.56
In 1932, Massachusetts passed an act 57 providing for the sus-
pension of an operator's license for failure to satisfy a final judg-
ment for property damage arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
In 1937, Michigan 58 and Delaware 9 passed acts providing for the
suspension of an operator's license for failure to satisfy a judg-
ment for bodily injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle.
Ultimately, 29 states and the District of Columbia passed similar
acts.6" The respective courts have dutifully upheld this form of
financial responsibility law as a valid exercise of the police power
of the state.6 1 In 1941, New York passed a financial responsibility
act which provided for the suspension of an operator's license
upon the failure to show financial responsibility immediately
following the accident.6 2
B. Compulsory Insurance Legislation Compared to Financial
Responsibility Legislation
Financial responsibility laws have been instrumental in
greatly increasing the percentage of motorists carrying liability
"House Bill No. 4, then pending.
In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 AUt. 117 (1925).
In 1937, an act was passed in New Hampshire requiring proof of financial
- responsibility as a condition precedent to the registration of a motor vehicle
upon which there was a lien or mortgage. In Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N. H.
314, 197 Atl. 390 (1938), the court held this act unconstitutional because of
the arbitrary discrimination in its provision.
'Mass. General Laws, Ch. 90 (1932).
"Mich. General Laws, Sec. 4685-52 and 4685-53, as amended by P. A. 228,
Acts 1937.
"Del. General Laws, Sec. 223 (1937).
Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Col., Del., D. C., Ill., Kans., Ky., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Mo., Mont., N. H., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Ore., Pa., R. I., S. D., Utah, Vt.,
Va., Wash., W. Va., and Wisc.
Reitz v. Mealey, Commissioner, 313 U. S. 442, 61 Sup. Ct. 841 (1941); Gar-
ford Trucking Inc. v. Hoffman, 114 N. J. L. 522, 177 Atl. 882 (1935); Watson
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931); Munz v.
Commissioner, 6 F. Supp. 158 (1933); Rawson v. Department of Licenses,
130 Pac. 2d 876 (Wash. 1942).
"N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Laws, Art. 6-A.
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insurance. It has been seen that in the State of New York, only
6% of its motorists are not covered by insurance, 3 and of this
group, many are financially responsible. Nevertheless, in Mas-
sachusetts, with a compulsory insurance law, 100% of the motor-
ists are financially responsible. The law is direct, simple to inter-
pret and to administer, and easily enforced; yet the majority of
the states have some form of financial responsibility legislation
while Massachusetts alone has compulsory insurance. The chief
reason for this is that insurance groups present a strong lobby in
opposition to such legislation, partly because they would then
have to insure poor risks, and partly because such a law might
force a reduction in commissions to agents and brokers, which
now aggregate more than $50 million a year on automobile liabil-
ity insurance underwriting in New York alone.64 They gleefully
point out that the insurance rates in Massachusetts are double
or triple the rates in other states.
It is probable that those most conscientious, most responsible
financially, and best able to compensate serious injury are the
very car owners who voluntarily carry automobile liability in-
surance. Those who do not carry insurance feel no compulsion to
do so until they have had their "one good accident." Then, they
must buy insurance in order to continue operating a vehicle, and
are thereafter financially responsible. But we cannot presuppose
that all or most accidents are caused by repeaters; such a propo-
sition is certainly not tenable. The groups who need the insurance
the most are the groups who do not have it-minors and others
driving antiquated vehicles in poor mechanical condition, those
persons living in congested areas who cannot get insurance for
one reason or another, and poor risks whom the insurance com-
panies will not insure. If they are poor risks for the insurance
companies, they unquestionably are poor risks for the general
public.
Curiously enough, financial responsibility legislation is form-
ing a cycle that is almost completed. Massachusetts, the first
state to recognize the need, passed a compulsory insurance law.
Following this were the acts providing for the revocation of the
operator's license upon failure to satisfy a final judgment, and
ultimately, acts were passed providing for the suspension of an
operator's license upon failure to post security following an acci-
'N. Y. Safety Responsibility Annual Report (1950).
"348 CCH Ins. Law. Rep., p. 8 (1952).
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dent. In 1951, the State of New York passed acts which required
owners of motor vehicles who are minors6 5 and those who operate
taxi-cabs 6 to have liability insurance before being permitted to
register a vehicle or to buy license plates for this vehicle. Thus,
the gap between financial responsibility legislation and compul-
sory insurance was considerably narrowed. Two bills providing
for compulsory insurance for all67 and having Governor Dewey's
support6 s have already been presented to the New York legisla-
ture. Maryland,6 9 New Jersey70 and Arizona7 ' have similar bills
before their legislatures. The New York Times, in editorial,72
states that compulsory insurance is the logical next step in the
steadily growing book of laws to protect the public. It appears
that we are gradually approaching this step and will eventually
complete the cycle begun by Massachusetts in 1925.
5 N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Laws, Sec. la (1951).
"N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Laws, Sec. 17 (1951).
, S. B. 2050 and S. B. 2188. The purpose of these bills is to amend Sec. Ila
of the Vehicle and Traffic Laws which applies to minors so that it will apply
to all.
"New York Times. December 28, 1951, p. 20.
H. B. 43.
oA. B. 250.
lS. B. 61.
"December 28, 1951, p. 20.
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